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1              introduction and objectives
Current debates surrounding normative ethics
have largely fallen into three schools of
though: deontological, consequentialist and
virtue ethical notions. In terms of
decolonization, however, comparatively little
progress has been made to construct a moral
framework for those who continue to suffer
from oppression the world over. Thus, I tackle
this problem of colonized ethics, in which
ethical concepts are tainted with traditional
liberal notions of the individual, which has
largely been accepted. I will argue, however,
that it is precisely this concept of the
inidivudual, and the separation of this entity
from the concept of acts which further serve
to enfore dehumanizing concepts of morality. 
abstract
Both deontological and consequentialist notions of ethics have been duly criticized, the former due to the problem of
universal maxims that ignore the delicate intricacies of situations that demand contextual understanding and the latter for
ignoring the various moral processes that precede actions. This disillusionment has led some feminists to adopt the ethics of
care as a way to subvert patriarchal tones and dehumanizing themes in moral discourse as well a moral relativism that has
often been categorized as the ethics of the postmodern age. Yet all normative moral theories, including the ethics of care
and moral relativism, posit that the individual is necessarily at the center of any moral equation, as she is the source of all
actions of moral consideration. However, I will argue that current debates surrounding morality continue to enforce
dehumanizing notions of ethics insofar as the insistence that moral acts and actors are separate foci of interest. Rather than
elucidating the complexities of moral discourse and thereby revealing hidden ideological underpinnings, ethical matters
continue to obfuscate power relations by maintaining the chasm between acts and their actors. In doing so, moral acts
become disembodied, in a sense, and detached from its actor in an alienating relationship that emphasizes neither care nor
respect for personhood. In this manner, I will argue that moral acts can never be “separated” from their actors, for in doing
so morality becomes external to actors, and therefore subject to abuses of power that reinforce a process of ideological
dehumanization. There are therefore no such things as moral “acts”. It is only by understanding the inseparability of acts and
actors that a morality of and for the oppressed can materialize through the actualization of the truly unified moral actor.
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Thus, the main objective of this project is clear:
decolonization of ethics that seeks to truly serve
the oppressed must focus on this separation of
acts from actors, a split which is the product of
the current framework that seeks to ensure the
facilitation of the status quo by ensuring the
continued alienation that results from the
continued modernist and liberal insistence that
acts and actors can be separately analyzed. 
step which becomes problematic: the
association of normativity with action. In other
words, the analysis of morality becomes the
analysis of actions. Yet, in doing so, the actor
becomes superfluous to the overall structure
of ethics, acting as a mere placeholder for
actions. Moral philosophers may counter that
of course the actor is important- she is the
source (cause) of such actions. Unfortunately,
such claims are merely declarative, as the
current sutdy of ethics does not necessitate
the study of the actor herself. In fact, the
current philosophical structure of ethics places
supremecy in the actions themselves, of which
the actor then becomes attached as a mere
afterthought. This leads to further alienation. 
If the objective is a framework that casts ethics
in favor of the oppressed, then the foundation
of that framework is the notion of acts,
specificially in relation to the actor. Of course,
this presents the first hurdle to clear: what is
morality if not the analysis of what the actor
ought to do? There is no problem with this
question insofar as the formation of a
framework goes. However, it is the very next 
Given the problem, any attempts at an ethics
for the oppressed must reject any moral
analysis that focuses purely on the acts and
disregards the intensely intimate notion
between acts and actors. In fact, I will go even
farther: acts and actors are composed of the
same substance. In other words, actors and
actions are ontologically inseparable. This
framework- the inseparability of the actor
from actions- means that the possibility of the
actor being alienated by the pervasive
ideology that underlies the analysis of her
actions becomes impossible. Furthermore, the
ontology of the actor and actions is processual:
there is no possibility of the "Other-than" (a
version of Edward Soja's "an-Other") in the
ontologically static realm of the is. Rather, much
like Whitehead's conception of existence as
constantly becoming, so too is this new
framework, in which the actor and action form a
new entity- what I refer to as the a̶c̶t̶or- which is
always in the process of becoming. This ensures
that the individual is always capable of upsetting
the necessary establishment of norms that serve
as the foundation for ideological oppression.
which continue to assume Eurocentric ideals
of what constitutes the individual as well as
the tacit acceptance of the ideological
structure that comes inherent with this
individual. 
To combat this, I have provided the foundation
for a new ethics, one that allies itself with
those suffering from oppression in all its
pernicious forms. This framework necessarily
makes inviolable the actor and actions, and
the concept of the a̶c̶t̶or replaces the liberal
individual as the source for this new ethics. In
doing so, I hope that this conception will
further the fight by both academics and
activists for a future and a world in which
oppression is eradicated once and for all. 
In this brief overview, I argue that the current
paradigm within which ethics operates is
inherently based on the liberal notion of the
autonomous individual. Many philosophers and
activists, when discussing the plight of the
oppressed, based and continue to base
arguments upon this conception of the
individual, merely universalizing it. However,
this produces obvious problems, not the least of
